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Abstract
The present essay explores the essential meaning of 
freedom of speech in the context of contemporary con-
stitutional democracy. In addressing the question of how 
free speech constitutional clause should be understood 
in an universe full of controversial cases, the study artic-
ulates three main propositions: 1.Freedom of speech is 
the right not to be prevented from speaking or not to 
be punished for speaking based on the alleged unac-
ceptability of an idea (taken as incorrect, inappropriate, 
stupid, irrelevant, shocking, dangerous, etc.); 2. Freedom 
of speech grants protection no matter the content of the 
message because the exchange of ideas is valuable for 
reasons other than the substantive qualities of what is 
said; to be worthy of protection, speech does not need to 
be infallible, clever or polite, but only play an expressive 
role in the process of discussion; 3. Freedom of speech 
doesn’t collide with rights of others, especially in the case 
Resumo
O presente ensaio explora o significado essencial da liberda-
de de expressão no contexto da democracia constitucional 
contemporânea. Ao abordar a questão de como a cláusula 
constitucional da livre expressão deve ser entendida em um 
universorepleto de casos controversos, o estudo apresenta 
três proposições principais: 1. A liberdade de expressão é o 
direito de não ser impedido de falar ou de não ser punido 
por falar com base na suposta inaceitabilidade de uma 
ideia (tomada como incorreta, inapropriada, estúpida, 
irrelevante, chocante, perigosa, etc.); 2. A liberdade de ex-
pressão garante proteção qualquer que seja o conteúdo da 
mensagem porque a troca de idéias é valiosa por outras ra-
zões que não as qualidades substantivas do que é dito; para 
ser digno de proteção, o discurso não precisa ser infalível, in-
teligente ou polido, mas apenas desempenhar uma função 
expressiva no processo de discussão; 3. A liberdade de ex-
pressão não colide com direitos dos outros, especialmente 
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1. INTRODUCTION: A CRITICAL QUESTION
Constitutional democracy is a way of organizing relations between government 
and individuals inside national states. It is essentially characterized by the acceptance 
of a written or unwritten constitution that performs as a higher law and guarantees 
even against governmental powers certain human rights that, according to historical 
and rational agreement, people may never be deprived of, such as life, freedom, pro-
perty, equality, due process and vote. Freedom of speech is probably the brightest star 
in the constellation of constitutional rights.
In a first approach, freedom of speech could be defined as a principle accor-
ding to which individuals must have the liberty to hold and express ideas through oral 
language and writing, symbolic gestures or images, in any platform and concerning a 
variety of matters, from politics to religion, economy to history, without fearing or suf-
fering censorship or punishment. However, despite of what this broad concept might 
suggest, freedom of speech is not conceived anywhere as a right that grants protection 
to everything that can be uttered. In free speech American legal doctrine, for instance, 
it is very well known the famous adage of US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Holmes, who 
proclaimed long ago that “the most stringent protection of free speech would not pro-
tect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic”1. This old sentence 
expresses a view that remains as one of the most powerful in free speech thinking and 
ruling everywhere: freedom of speech is limited, it does not cover all kinds of speech. 
Some crimes committed with the use of language - like threats, slander, false 
alarms, harassment, conspiracy or blackmail - are considered unworthy of protection 
without contention. It seems they don’t even get to fit into a satisfactory concept of 
1 Schenck v. United States. Supreme Court of the United States. 249 U.S 47 (1919).
of assertive speech acts, that is, assertions of facts and 
values that the speaker sincerely believes to be true or 
correct; even when the content sounds outrageous, as-
serting something doesn’t imply violation of anyone’s 
right, but rather it means the exercise of one’s own right.
Keywords: constitutional democracy; content neutrality; 
freedom of speech; tolerance; equity.
no caso dos atos da fala assertivos, isto é, de asserções de 
fatos e valores que o falante acredita que sãoverdadeiras 
ou corretas; mesmo quando soe ultrajante, asserir algo não 
implica violação de direito alheio, mas significa o exercício 
do próprio direito.
Palavras-chave: democracia constitucional; neutralidade 
de conteúdo; liberdade de expressão; tolerância; equidade.
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speech. But there are some other kinds of speech that raise serious controversy. Is the 
government allowed to prohibit the so-called hate speech, a flag burning demons-
tration, disclosure of classified information, civil disobedience advocacy, statements 
against gay marriage? Or would such a ban impose an unconstitutional constraint on 
speech? These are dilemmas that every democracy must face.
There are no easy answers. First, competitive values seem to be in contradiction 
sometimes. Hate speech cases, for example, bring to the debate the tension between 
the need of protecting individual autonomy and the commitment in defending racial, 
religious or sexual groups. Beyond that, language is a complex phenomenon. There are 
endless things people can say with the most different styles, intonation, motives and 
intentions, in the most diverse situations and settings. Hate speech itself is not a uni-
vocal category. As Kent Greenawalt observes, “criticizing Jews in a classroom discussion 
or in the middle of campus is not the same as reviling a Jewish student in his room or 
posting an anti-Semitic sign opposite his door”2. So, should we treat both speech in the 
same way? Should all hate speech be banned or protected, or only a part of it? Could we 
accept general racist assertions, but not personal targeted vilification?   
To make things a little harder, constitutional stipulations are not able to provide 
solution for all possible situations of contentious speech. Generally, free speech cons-
titutional clause is written in brief and open terms. Constitutional language does not 
usually refer to unprotected categories in an exhausting way or with enough specificity. 
American Constitution, for instance, dictates that “Congress shall make no law [...] abri-
dging freedom of speech, or of the press” and nothing more. For this reason, in liberal 
legal systems judges have been called to fill the normative emptiness and to determine 
free speech limits in the context of controversial cases. It is a task that requires wisdom 
because of what is at stake in the decision-making process. 
In fact, the question about how far to protect and how far to restrict speech is a 
critical one for democracy. Somebody who says something eventually forbidden is not 
only saying something inappropriate, unpleasant or repulsive, is not only challenging a 
good manners book. He is breaking the law, he is making something illegal, something 
that exposes him to official and severe consequences, such as civil liability or criminal 
penalty. So, defining protected and unprotected speech means to draw a line between 
speech that may be punished and that may not, between speech that may be used to 
send a man to jail or to take away his money and that may not, between speech that 
may be banned from public debate and that may not. It is not about defining good or 
bad ideas, polite or impolite speech, but rather than that, it’s about separating lawful 
from unlawful speech, with the good and the bad consequences attached.
2 GREENAWALT, Kent. Fighting words: individuals, communities, and liberties of speech. New Jersey: Prin- 
ceton University Press, 1995, p. 73.
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Constitutional courts should be very cautious in interpreting and implementing 
the free speech constitutional clause. It is of utmost importance to create clear, simple 
and stable rules, capable of indicating without uncertainty and in advance what, after 
all, citizens are allowed or forbidden to say, or what the government is entitled to ban 
and punish concerning speech. In line with the basic principle of the Rule of Law, peo-
ple have the right to prior knowledge about what is right and wrong, and a rhetorical, 
imprecise or hesitant judicial ruling on freedom of speech tends to generate self-cen-
sorship and opens the door forex post facto punishments.
The present essay seeks to explore the essential meaning of freedom of speech 
in the context of contemporary democracy and aims at answering the question about 
how free speech constitutional clause should be understood. The intention here is not 
to describe the constitutional law of particular jurisdictions, but to propose a concept 
of freedom of speech consistent with the ideals of any government that claims to be 
democratic. Although involving a personal way to see the things, the following ideas 
are certainly influenced by a set of judicial precedents and correspond to a dominant 
philosophical viewpoint. In order to accomplish our goals, it seems a good idea to be-
gin considering Oliver Holmes’s analogy on the false cry of fire.
2. THE FALSE CRY OF FIRE 
In 1917, the United States got into the World War I. Under an atmosphere of 
patriotism around the country, President Woodrow Wilson proposed, and the Congress 
approved the Espionage Act3. This legislation made it a crime to cause, attempt to cause 
or conspire to cause insubordination in the American military or obstruction of mili-
tary recruitment4. At the time, Americans could not turn down calls for war. Charles 
Schenck, then secretary general of the Socialist Party in Philadelphia, had distributed 
pamphlets comparing conscription to slavery and urging conscripts to reject fighting a 
war on behalf of Wall Street interests.
Prosecuted and convicted on charges of attempting to cause insubordination 
and to obstruct recruitment, Schenck appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not allow Congress to pass 
any law restricting freedom of speech. However, the Supreme Court, without dissent, 
upheld the conviction. The leading opinion came from Oliver Wendell Holmes. He ad-
mitted that, in normal times, Schenck’s words would be protected but not in times of 
war. He pointed out that “the character of every act depends upon the circumstances 
3 See: LEWIS, Anthony. Freedom for the thought that we hate: a biography of the First Amendment. New 
York: Basic Books, 2007, p. 25.
4 See: FALLON, Richard H. The dynamic Constitution: an introduction to American Constitutional Law. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004, p. 34.
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in which it is done” and that “the question in every case is whether the words used are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress  has a right to 
prevent”. This view implied a non-absolutist reading of the apparently inflexible words 
of the First Amendment and, to support it, Holmes produced his famous analogy: “the 
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting 
fire in a theatre and causing a panic”5. 
Schenck versus the United States is no longer an active precedent. The “clear and 
present danger” formula was too vague and could be easily manipulated. According 
to Kent Greenawalt, in a case decided the following week by the Supreme Court6, a 
man was punished for helping to publish twelve articles of small-circulation according 
to which the resistant recruits, tough “technically wrong”, were more victims of a sin 
against themselves than sinners. “Thousands of people were convicted and sent to jail 
during World War I for comments no stronger than this”7. Perhaps, that is why in Abrams 
versus the United States8 Holmes himself rearticulated his arguments and introduced 
more demanding conditions for punishing speech9; in Whitney versus California10 Louis 
Brandeis set an even more restrictive position. The dissenting votes11 of Holmes and 
Brandeis, in these two cases, became memorable and had significant influence in the 
development of the modern American legal doctrine regarding subversive speech. In 
1969, in Brandenburg v. Ohio12(without Holmes and Brandeis at the time) the Supreme 
Court took a new legal opinion under which Schenck would not have been convicted, 
if earlier available.
Then, what may seem intriguing is that although the reasons that led to Schen-
ck’s conviction no longer exist or would not be enough now, Holmes’s analogy on the 
false cry of fire still stands as an axiom about free speech limits. How to understand 
that? The reason is simple but not always perceived. Between a false cry of fire in a 
crowded theater to induce panic and the messages contained in the leaflets distributed 
by Schenck there is a huge difference. The analogy supposed by Holmes does not exist, 
5 Schenck v. United States. Supreme Court of the United States. 249 U.S 47 (1919).
6  Frohwerk v. United States. Supreme Court of the United States. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
7 GREENAWALT, Kent. Fighting words: individuals, communities, and liberties of speech. New Jersey: Princ-
eton University Press, 1995, p. 17-18.
8 Abrams v. United States. Supreme Court of the United States. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
9 See: SHAPIRO, Martin. Freedom of speech: the Supreme Court and judicial review. New Jersey: Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc., 1966, p. 49.
10 Whitney v. California. Supreme Court of the United States. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
11 From a formal point of view, Louis Brandeis’ opinion did not constitute a disagreement since, for procedural 
reasons, he maintained the appellant’s conviction. However, his views about free speech have revealed a pro-
found dissent from previous Supreme Court decisions.
12 Brandenburg v. Ohio. Supreme Court of the United States. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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and therefore, it is entirely acceptable that between the two communications one may 
deserve protection while the other does not. 
According to Alan Dershowitz, the false cry of fire in a crowded theater is pro-
bably the only legal analogy to receive the status of a popular argument in the United 
States. It is, he says, an analogy often invoked when people try to get the government 
to censor any kind of speech that they deem unacceptable. However, still according to 
him, “in spite of its hallowed position in both the jurisprudence of the First Amendment 
and the arsenal of political discourse, it is and was an inapt analogy, even in the context 
in which it was originally offered”13. The context to which Dershowitz refers is precisely 
the Schenck case, and it is important to follow his criticism to understand why the false 
cry of fire is not worthy of protection. 
Dershowitz makes two essential remarks. First, Schenck’s leaflets contained a 
political message that encouraged recruits to think about it and then, if they wished, 
to act in a non-violent manner. The man who shouts fire in a crowded theater is neither 
sending a political message nor inviting his readers to think about it and decide what 
to do in a rational, calculated way. “On the contrary, the message is designed to force 
action without contemplation. The message ‘Fire!’ is directed not to the mind and the 
conscience of the listener but, rather, to his adrenaline and his feet. It is a stimulus to 
immediate action, not thoughtful reflection”14. In this sense, the cry of fire is not even 
speech; it is “a clang sound”, the equivalent of a non-verbal alarm that triggers an auto-
matic response, different from that of political rhetoric.
Secondly, the cry in question is dishonest, once the speaker knows that there is 
no real fire. The messages contained in Schenck’s leaflets, however, cannot be blamed 
of having the same flaw, it is to say, of being the result of a conscious and intentional 
lie. Schenck sincerely expressed political ideas about the war, ideas that are true in the 
perspective of the speaker’s mind, and as the United States Supreme Court came to 
reaffirm in Falwell versus Hustler, “the First Amendment does not recognize such a thing 
as a false idea”15. For these reasons, Dershowitz thinks Holmes analogy in the Schenck 
case is not only inappropriate but also insulting16.
In fact, it seems that the false cry of fire is something that is done by saying, not 
something that is only said. Whoever falsely shouts fire knowing there is no fire at all 
does not really asserts or warns about anything, but rather pretends to make it, faking 
13 DERSHOWITZ, Alan M. Shouting Fire: Civil Liberties in a Turbulent Age. Little, Brown and Company, 2002, 
p. 143.
14 DERSHOWITZ, Alan M. Shouting Fire: Civil Liberties in a Turbulent Age. Little, Brown and Company, 2002, 
p. 143-144.
15 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. Supreme Court of the United States. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). See also: Gertz v. 
Robert Welch Inc. Supreme Court of the United States. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
16 DERSHOWITZ, Alan M. Shouting Fire: Civil Liberties in a Turbulent Age. Little, Brown and Company, 2002, 
p. 144-145.
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to believe and intending to deceive the listeners. This is more acting than expressing. 
Only pay attention to the grammar: the verbs “lie”, “fake”, “pretend” and “deceive” denote 
deeds, or acts of misrepresentation, a kind of fraud, and not, in a proper sense, commu-
nicative acts of thoughts and beliefs.
The problem with the false cry of fire is not the content of the message, but the 
behavior of the speaker, is not the inaccuracy of the sentence, but the insincerity of the 
utterer. If there was a real fire, nobody would qualify shouting as a misconduct. If there 
wasn’t a real fire, but the speaker thought there was (because of defective perception or 
amid a delirium crisis), it is hard to imagine he could be punished since shouting would 
only be a manner of speaking his mind, a way of speaking about something he believed 
to be true, although it was not.
3. SPEECH AND EXPRESSIVE VALUE 
In constitutional democracy, as we know, speech is often restricted by statutory 
law. Speech is a target that never gets out of reach. However, since there are cases in 
which restrictions are easily and widely accepted (as it happens about criminal offenses 
like encouragements to suicide), but there are others in which restrictions are seriously 
questionable (as it happens with religious statements against gay marriage), it is su-
pposed that there might be some attribute related to the type of the speech that makes 
the difference. What would it be? 
Even recognizing that every speech has singularities and needs to be conside-
red on a case-by-case basis, it is possible to isolate a general point of discordance be-
tween the quiet and the controversial cases of speech restriction. The contrast between 
the false cry of fire in a crowded theater and the message contained in Schenck’s lea-
flets is useful to illustrate the difference. Simply, what happens is that the false cry of 
fire has no expressive value or does not fulfill any expressive function, and precisely for 
this motive, according to an assumption universally shared, it is not reached or covered 
by free speech constitutional clause. The note of distinction resides, therefore, in the 
concept of expressive value. The basic idea is as follows.
As it is normally understood, free speech grants protection no matter the con-
tent of the message. Free speech prohibits government to censor or punish speech 
based on the supposed incorrectness of what people think and say. In this case, it is in-
tuitive that speech is protected because it is supposed to be valuable for reasons other 
than the substantive qualities of the message. Imagine, for instance, that the congress 
is about to pass an act on the use of embryonic cells for research purposes. If everyone 
can freely argue, against or in favor, it is because it is expected, among other things, that 
a better political deliberation can be found if the voices from side to side are listened. 
Speech is protected because it seems important despite the orientation of the ideas. It 
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does not matter if one’s opinion is not the best or the wiser, but just that it somehow 
enriches the public debate. In this sense, having expressive value only means that the 
speech plays an expressive role in the process of discussion.
In synthesis, there are five major arguments on why freedom of speech is valuab-
le no matter the content of the ideas. We can summarize them by borrowing a few 
words from Greenawalt17. The first(democracy) proposes that free speech promotes the 
functioning of democracy, which is based on the concept of self-government. Citizens 
must be free to openly speak and listen to better exercise their sovereign functions. 
The second (truth) proposes that open discussion promotes the discovery of the truth 
and the progress of knowledge. The claim is that truth and knowledge are most likely 
to emerge from the collision of ideas. The third (autonomy) proposes that free speech 
promotes individual autonomy, mainly because it allows people to enjoy information 
and opinions important for them to make up their own minds instead of living by the 
dictates of others. The fourth (tolerance) proposes that free speech promotes toleran-
ce. If the speech rights of dissenters and radicals are granted, the lesson addressed by 
society is that everyone should be tolerant with those who think different. The last one 
(equality) proposes that if men are all equal in dignity, it would be wrong to prevent 
only some ideas to be expressed, once this would mean that the ones who hold them 
are less dignified than others. 
Speech has expressive value when it reaches some of these reasons; when none 
of them is applicable, speech simply lacks expressive value. The false cry of fire lacks ex-
pressive value because it is not the kind of assertion apt to be a part of any intellectual 
dispute around truth, it is not a way of engaging in the democratic process, or parti-
cipating in political life, it is not a way of affirming or improving individual autonomy, 
it is not a way of exercising equal rights and, not enough, it is not compatible with a 
demand for tolerance.
The leaflets of Schenck were different. First, thinking and saying that conscrip-
tion is a form of slavery is to make a genuine assertion, that is, to enunciate seriously 
and literally a proposition about the world (or some state of affairs) believed to be true 
and intended to be taken as such. Second, thinking and suggesting recruits to refuse 
the draft may be taken as an exhortation (a directive speech act), that is, as saying so-
mething to get others to act, but even so, it is not the case of incitement to violence, 
nor of advocating illegal activities, once deciding not to join the army, in the speaker’s 
mind, is no less than an individual right. In the end, it seems that Schenck’s message 
was a complaint for political changes based on his sincere beliefs about unfair burdens 
on young American citizens. Here, all free speech values apply.  
17 See: GREENAWALT, Kent. Speech, crime, and the uses of language. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989, p. 9-39.
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Having expressive value is the first requirement for a speech to be deemed wor-
thy of protection. It would be an exaggeration to immunize messages to which none of 
the reasons underlying free speech clause is applicable, as it happens with the false cry 
of fire. Accordingly, to determine whether a given speech has expressive value is vital 
for investigating the adequacy of some restriction upon it in constitutional democracy. 
Of course, the concept of expressive value asks fora more comprehensive con-
sideration, and at this point political philosophy is the best companion one can find31. 
Constitutional provisions proclaim the rights, but their justifications are generally sub-
merged; they are not on the surface, but in the depths of the human thinking. Eric 
Barendt rightly points out that “a constitution may reflect commitment to a general 
concept of freedom of speech, but the particular understandings or conceptions of that 
freedom are best elucidated by an examination of the moral and political reasons justi-
fying its protection”18. So, let’s take a closer look on them.
4. FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY
Free speech is commonly thought to promote democracy. Democracy rests on 
the principle of self-government, whereby political decisions ultimately belong to ci-
tizens either directly or through representatives. In the logic of the system, freedom 
of speech fulfills central functions, such as allowing voters to make informed choices 
in elections. Also, thanks to freedom of speech, people can influence public policies, 
and authorities are subject to criticism that may lead to their replacement. Abuse of 
power and corruption can be denounced and maybe prevented by fear of revelation. 
Beyond that, conflicting interests in the community are identified and accommodated 
in favor of social stability, and individuals and minorities that openly dissent may relie-
ve frustrations and do not need to use violence as an alternative to get power, to fight 
government programs or to gain attention for reformist claims. Finally, better political 
deliberations should be taken with the audience of all sides of debate. 
The connection between freedom of speech and democratic process is the basis 
of some influential essays written by Alexander Meiklejohn regarding the Constitution 
of the United States19. In line with his ideas, in New York Times versus Sullivan, one of the 
most acclaimed precedents of modern American legal doctrine concerning freedom of 
speech, the US Supreme Court referred to the ability to criticize the government and its 
18 BARENDT, Eric. Freedom of Speech. 2. ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 3.
19 MEIKLEJOHN, Alexander. Political freedom: the constitutional powers of the people. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1965, 164 p. See also: Free speech and its relation to self-government (1948); What does the 
First Amendment mean? (1953); Testimony presented before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Unit-
ed States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (1955); The First Amendment is an absolute (1961). In: BLASI, 
Vincent. Ideas of the First Amendment. St. Paul: Thomson West (American Casebook Series), 2006, p. 747-756; 
p. 757-760; p. 760-772; p. 772-778.   
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agents as constituting “the central meaning of the First Amendment”20.When the case 
was decided holding that civil liability of the press (in the event of inaccurate news) 
requires actual malice, and not merely negligence, Meiklejohn even said that it was “an 
occasion for dancIng In the streets”21.
The rationale of democracy is subject to questioning. Does free speech really 
give voice to everyone in a world with economic inequalities? According to Owen Fiss, 
“the rich may, for example, so dominate advertising space in the media and other pu-
blic domains that the public will, in effect, hear only their message, and as a result, the 
voice of the less affluent may simply be drowned out”22. Moreover, mass media are un-
der the control of few people because newspapers and magazines demand a high cost 
of operation, and the waves of radio and television have limited availability. Those who 
have them have a higher power of influence. However, even if we are here before un-
deniable facts, it seems that none of them can make freedom of speech less important 
within the framework of democratic government.
The concept of democracy is impractical if citizens do not have the right to spe-
ak and listen freely. Distortions of power are relevant, and the challenge is to search 
for alternative means of compensating them positively or giving voice for those who 
doesn’t have it. But even if free speech seems to have more formal than real dimension 
in contrast with mass media holders, it does not mean it has no utility, or that it is not an 
instrument for the exercise of political rights. Besides, it is supposed that the press itself 
is many times the voice of the people.
Anyway, the Internet significantly changed the scenario. Things are not anymo-
re as in the last century, in which people found themselves mostly in the passive side of 
the communicative relationship. Jack Balkin describes the new paradigm as it follows: 
“Internet speech is participatory and interactive. People don’t merely watch (or listen 
to) the Internet as if it were television or radio. Rather, they surf through it, they pro-
gram on it, they publish to it, they write comments and continually add things to it. In-
ternet speech is a social activity that involves exchange, give and take. The roles of rea-
der and writer, producer and consumer of information are blurred and often effectively 
merge”23. So, maybe the Internet has not replaced the mass media, but the distribution 
of the power to communicate seems already less unequal.
20 New York Times v. Sullivan. Supreme Court of the United States. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21 KALVEN, Harry. The New York Times Case: a Note on the “Central Meaning of the First Amendment. In: BLASI, 
Vincent. Ideas of the First Amendment. St. Paul: Thomson West (American Casebook Series), 2006, p. 788.
22 FISS, Owen M. The Irony of Free Speech. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 16.
23 BALKIN, Jack M. Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Informa-
tion Society. In: BLASI, Vincent. Ideas of the First Amendment. St. Paul: Thomson West (American Casebook 
Series), 2006, p. 834.
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In connection with democracy, freedom of speech tends only to justify the co-
verage of ideas and messages with political content or interacting in the political pro-
cess. So, if democracy was the only basis for protecting freedom of speech, things like 
self-help literature, commercial advertising, sports journalism and entertainment ma-
gazines would be left out of perspective. More important: the same could happen with 
allegedly defamatory or invasive statements. Probably, these types of speech would be 
understood as not belonging to the constitutional worries, and in this case, greater or 
lesser freedom related to them would then depend on the legislative power. But this is 
not how things are: freedom of speech is valued for reasons other than democracy, and 
then, it justifies much more than just political messages. 
5. FREE SPEECH AND TRUTH
In On liberty, Stuart Mill claims that speech must be protected for the sake of 
clarifying the truth. According to him, the suppression of ideas is a crime committed 
against present and future generations. “If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose […] the clearer percep-
tion and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error”24. Moreover, 
according to Mill, between conflicting doctrines none of them are wholly false or exact, 
and each contains a portion of error and truth, so that truth will often result from the 
sharing between them25. Thus, free speech enables mankind to replace long-held mis-
conceptions, as well as to test and revitalize truths that would be, otherwise, no more 
than dead dogmas. In essence, as Erwin Chemerinsky said, “the argument is that truth 
is most likely to emerge from the clash of ideas”26.   
Thomas Emerson stresses that the truth rationale applies regardless of how false 
and harmful an idea appears to be. On the one hand, he writes, “many of the most sig-
nificant advances in human knowledge – from Copernicus to Einstein – have resulted 
from challenging hitherto unquestioned assumptions”, so that no opinion should ever 
be deemedirrefutable. On the other hand, “the unaccepted opinion may be true or par-
tially true, and there is no way of suppressing the false without suppressing the true”. 
Last of all, “even if the new opinion is wholly false, its presentation and open discussion 
serves a vital social purpose” because it provokes the reappraisal of the settled opinion 
and leads to a deeper understanding of its evil meaning27.
24 MILL, John Stuart. On liberty. In: BLASI, Vincent. Ideas of the First Amendment. St. Paul: Thomson West 
(American Casebook Series), 2006, p. 327.
25 MILL, John Stuart. On liberty. In: BLASI, Vincent. Ideas of the First Amendment. St. Paul: Thomson West 
(American Casebook Series), 2006, p. 347-348.
26 CHEMERINSKY, Erwin. Constitutional law: principles and policies. New York: Aspen Publishers, 2006, p. 927.
27 EMERSON, Thomas I. Toward a general theory of the First Amendment. New York: Random House, Inc., 
1966, p. 7-8.
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The pursuit of truth is important as a means for the progress of humanity and 
individuals. For practical purposes, it is important to know, for example, whether the 
decisive factor for the reduction of the ozone layer is the burning of fossil fuels or the 
destruction of forests; what level of security the financial market is offering; what kind 
of influence movies of explicit brutality have on child psychology; from which moment 
the fetus in the mother’s womb begins to feel pain; whether or not there is an epide-
mic outbreak or increased violence in a requested tourist destination. Relevant social, 
business and personal decisions may depend on what is concluded, and, at least in 
principle, it is believable that responses that are more reliable or closer to the truth will 
be obtained if there is room for discussion and confrontation rather than suppression of 
opinions and information that governments might anticipate as false.
Truth rationale justifies coverage for a wide range of subjects (history, business, 
morals, literature, science, etc.), going beyond protection for speech with political con-
tent, or engaged in the democratic process. Although it seems to fit better in the con-
text of controversies about objective facts, it does not fail to support the debate around 
purely moral valuations such as “capitalism is unjust”. Moreover, as in the case of demo-
cratic justification, truth rationale also supports dissent, even the most secluded one. In 
the words of Stuart Mill: “If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would 
be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would 
be justified in silencing mankind”28.
The decisive premise is that government is not entitled to sanction an official 
orthodoxy, defining what is right and wrong in politics, morals, history, archeology, 
economics, etc. Official doctrines against which is not allowed to argue under the risk 
of punishment are almost always suspect. Those who impose them not only lack the 
gift of infallibility but also are less interested in discovering the truth than in preserving 
their positions and fortune. Truth certainly has better changes when heresy and blas-
phemy are crimes that no law dares to recognize. 
Like the democratic justification, the truth rationale is not immune to objec-
tions. It is said there is sometimes the risk that atrocious doctrines, undisputedly false, 
may triumph among citizens, as they did in Nazi Germany after Hitler came to power 
in 1933, causing the genocide of six million Jews. Some contemporary democracies, 
believing so, came to prohibit the dissemination of ideas of racial superiority, making 
hate speech a crime. Nevertheless, even in those jurisdictions, hate speech seems to 
be a lonely exception to the general principle that freedom of speech in democracy is 
incompatible with a system of official truths. It seems, indeed, a singular case of conten-
t-based restriction, perhaps one understandable in the face of some local context and 
28 MILL, John Stuart. On liberty. In: BLASI, Vincent. Ideas of the First Amendment. St. Paul: Thomson West 
(American Casebook Series), 2006, p. 327.
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historical traumas. However, the major proposition still stands: government is not the 
owner of the truth and cannot suppress ideas because they are allegedly false.
6. FREE SPEECH AND AUTONOMY
Free speech is commonly taken as an imperative of human condition. If what 
decisively distinguishes man in the world of living creatures is the reasoning ability, 
the integral fulfillment of each person’s humanity implies the exercise of his rational 
faculties in fullness. It requires, first of all, freedom to think autonomously, or freedom 
of conscience. By freedom of conscience is designated a sphere of intellectual delibe-
ration under the exclusive domain of the individual, within which are ideas that, even 
sounding unfounded to others, are recognized as legitimate while belonging to a man 
and insofar as corresponding to the most significant of his vocations.
In practical terms, external control over the mind of others is not easy to attain. A 
man whose ideas are abhorred by the dominant power may be forbidden to say, under 
threat of penalties, what he thinks or be forced to say what he does not believe, and 
even doing so to save his life, in silence he can think what he actually thinks. Coercion 
will be enough to hinder speech and action but not to change his mind. The innermost 
secret of his consciousness is beyond reach; it is a land to which he alone has access. 
Frederick Schauer tells that prisoners in Nazi concentration camps used to sing a song 
called MeIne Gedänke SInd Frei (“my thoughts are free”)29.It is possible that by chanting 
some of them gathered moral strength that helped to resist and survive, above all, 
through the perception that although degraded to inhuman conditions, there was still 
in them a last and essential remnant of humanity, precisely their consciences, an invin-
cible force even for the most totalitarian power. 
Of course, it would not make sense to assure something like a right to think 
silently. In a normative perspective, the object of a freedom must be something suscep-
tible to prohibition. However, thinking in silence is a de facto freedom, a mental phe-
nomenon whose ban is impossible and ineffective. Therefore, to begin with, granting 
individuals the right to think in silence is not even logically bearable. Besides, allowing 
someone to think, as long as keeping thoughts quiet, means declaring the thoughts 
in question illicit. Finally, respect for human condition requires more than tolerating 
only a precarious use of rational faculties, such as developing an inner monologue as a 
resource to maintain self-consciousness. This can be useful for psychological defense in 
extreme situations, but it is legally insignificant. 
Freedom of conscience implies more than superfluous consent of secret rumi-
nations. It means that our thoughts, whether wise or not according to others, rightfully 
29 SCHAUER, Frederick. Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry. In: BLASI, Vincent. Ideas of the First Amend-
ment. St. Paul: Thomson West (American Casebook Series), 2006, p. 849.  
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belong to us. In a double sense: we are worthy of thinking by ourselves and our thou-
ghts are worthy of appropriation. Thoughts we have are, therefore, lawfully possessed. 
Moreover, once integrating man’s personality, thoughts are not exposed to any form 
of expropriation. The first consequence is that freedom of conscience consists of an 
excludendi alios right, that is, a right that excludes the right of others of intending to 
dominate the owner’s mind, dictating what to believe, what to feel or what to like. The 
second consequence is that the owner has the privilege to use what is his, which inclu-
des the power to express himself, mainly to communicate to others what he believes, 
understands, feels, perceives or prefers. So, freedom of conscience understood as such 
inevitably implicates freedom of speech as a result of man’s property on himself.
At the same time, autonomy depends, though not exclusively, on freedom of 
speech to be maximized. Schauer teaches that ideas are not static, they regularly chan-
ge, evolve, and refine. Thought is a process, and its main instruments are language and 
communication. “Minds do not grow in a vacuum. Intellectual isolationism is almost 
wholly inconsistent with intellectual development. The image of the mountaintop 
guru, developing great ideas in a sublime and isolated existence, is far more myth than 
reality”30. Schauer emphasizes that linguistic communication is significant for the intel-
lectual growth of man, both as speaker and as listener. Often someone has an incipient 
idea, but sees it develop or perceive its weaknesses at the first moment when it needs 
to be intelligibly transmitted to another person. According to Schauer, communication 
helps those who communicate to clarify and better understand their thoughts. On the 
other hand, listening, reading and seeing what others have to say puts a man in touch 
with a wide variety of opinions and information that he may not be able to imagine or 
articulate alone. In this case, says Schauer, communication offers the chance to practice 
the vital talent of evaluating and choosing between ideas31. Participating in communi-
cative relationships is, therefore, a way of elaborating, understanding, and optimizing 
the ability to think.
For the constitutional law, which disciplines relations between individuals and 
the government, the implication between freedom of conscience and freedom of 
speech has a very specific meaning. In the words of Charles Fried, “freedom of mind 
[…]places firm limits on government’s power to interfere with my liberty to think as I 
choose, to express my thoughts to others, and to receive their expressions in turn”, as 
well as to decide what to learn, hear, read, and see32. Likewise, Fried adds, it prevents 
30 SCHAUER, Frederick. Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry. In: BLASI, Vincent. Ideas of the First Amend-
ment. St. Paul: Thomson West (American Casebook Series), 2006, p. 850-851.  
31 SCHAUER, Frederick. Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry. In: BLASI, Vincent. Ideas of the First Amend-
ment. St. Paul: Thomson West (American Casebook Series), 2006, p. 851.  
32 FRIED, Charles. Saying What the Law is: The Constitution in the Supreme Court. Cambridge: HarvardUni-
versity Press, 2005, p. 79 e p. 81. 
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the government not only from suppressing thoughts and speech “but also against the 
government’s putting words in your mouth, compelling you to print what you do not 
want to print, affirming what you do not believe”. Freedom of conscience is, in synthe-
sis, “freedom from government mind control”33.
7. FREE SPEECH AND TOLERANCE
In The Tolerant Society, Lee Bollinger highlighted the teaching of tolerance as a 
reason for protecting speech. He starts from the premise that societies tend to follow 
and impose uniform ideas and practices and to be severe with dissenters, acting against 
them not only through legal penalties such as imprisonment but also through informal 
modes of punishment such as stigma and isolation. Stuart Mill also gave importance to 
this topic. According to him, social oppression is even more ruthless than legal oppres-
sion because although it is not based on extreme punishments, it leaves fewer ways 
to escape. In Mill’s view, human societies are predisposed to compel people to adjust-
ment, curbing development and, if possible, preventing the birth of any individuality in 
disharmony with its models34. 
Bollinger accepts the opinion about the tendency for inflexibility and the heavi-
ness of social oppression. “To have it said that you were once a communist sympathizer, a 
fascist, atheist, or a liar can make you, at least in most quarters within the society, socially 
and economically a pariah, as destitute as if you had been thrown in prison and fined”35. 
However, according to Bollinger, social hostility is often at the basis of legal punishments. 
“If there is a problem of a tendency to excessive intolerance [….], it would seem to be not 
with the ‘government’ alone but with ‘the people’ as well, acting through their govern-
ment”36. One of the most dramatic passages in the history seems to prove it. The torture 
and killing of Jesus Christ were formally consented by Pontius Pilate, procurator of the 
Roman emperor in Judea, but he acted reluctantly. According to the Gospel of John, Pi-
late washed his hands and delivered Jesus to martyrdom, but the one who imposed the 
outcome, at the risk of revolt, was the crowd in front of the Praetorium.
According to Bollinger, freedom of speech does the job of making people awa-
re of the need for tolerance. If minorities and dissidents are free to express what they 
think, the message addressed will be that respecting differences is a virtue. Free speech 
aims at educating for tolerance, that is, for the development of the social capacity to 
control the impulse to domesticate and, especially, to punish the divergent because of 
33 FRIED, Charles. Saying What the Law is: The Constitution in the Supreme Court. Cambridge: HarvardUni-
versity Press, 2005, p. 82 e p. 85.
34 MILL, John Stuart. On liberty. In: BLASI, Vincent. Ideas of the First Amendment. St. Paul: Thomson West 
(American Casebook Series), 2006, p. 320-321.
35 BOLLINGER, Lee C. The tolerant Society. New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1986, p. 109-110.
36 BOLLINGER, Lee C. The tolerant Society. New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1986, p. 79.
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their beliefs and convictions. A tolerant society is one that renounces the aspiration to 
coerce and harass by formal or informal means those who profess supposedly objectio-
nable ideas, whether political, moral or religious.
The rationale of tolerance also suggests that intolerance is somewhat useless 
because human mind is ultimately irrepressible. Pretending to dominate the conscien-
ce of dissidents should not be an objective for the government because it is not even 
feasible. Baruch de Espinosa, in his Tractatus Politicus, had already argued that a man 
could never be led to believe in what is contrary to his feelings and thoughts, to love 
what he hates or hate what he loves. According to him, the consequence is that all ac-
tions to which no one can be incited by promises or threats are outside the government 
purposes. No one, for example, can abdicate his ability to judge. The law that would try 
to compel human mind would be nothing but a delusion37.An analogous opinion is 
found in John Locke’s Letter on Tolerance. He thinks that no one may believe under the 
prescription of another. The nature of human understanding cannot be constrained 
by external forces. Confiscating property or tormenting the body with captivity and 
torture will be in vain if, through these torments, man in power want to deprive a man 
from his faith and beliefs38.
In addition, the argument of tolerance holds that more dangerous than gran-
ting free speech is subjecting speech to repressive controls. If force is futile and inef-
fective to constrain conscience, its employment will eventually provoke the resistance 
of true believers, and instead of harmony and concord there will be revolts, perhaps 
bloody ones. The religion wars that have swept Europe since the Reformation are attri-
buted more to the persecutions of schismatics and heretics than to the diversity of faith 
among men. Therefore, from a pragmatic point of view, intolerance is regarded as more 
dangerous to social order than tolerating speech that is allegedly false or pernicious. At 
worst, tolerance would be a minor evil, a way to replace the power of the sword with “a 
form of hospitality”39,giving peace a better chance. 
The inability to submit human mind and the danger of violent resistance are 
reasons for political prudence against intolerance. In L’età Del Diritti(The Age of Rights), 
Norberto Bobbio claims that there are some noble reasons for tolerance. Tolerance im-
plies exchanging methods of force by techniques of persuasion as a way of resolving 
conflicts; also, tolerance is an inherent necessity to the very nature of truth, which is 
not one and has many faces; and tolerance expresses our respect for others trough the 
recognition of every man’s right to believe according to his own conscience40. Thus, 
37 ESPINOSA, Baruch de. Tratado Político. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1983, p. 314-315.
38 LOCKE, John. Carta Sobre a Tolerância. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1987, p. 92-93.
39 TINDER, Glenn. Tolerance and Community. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995, p. 237.
40 BOBBIO, Norberto. A Era dos Direitos. 8. ed. Tradução de Carlos Nelson Coutinho. Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 
1992, p. 208-210. 
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tolerance is not only convenient but the one option consistent with democratic gover-
nments, the search for truth and individual autonomy.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL NEUTRALITY
When freely speaking is a way of engaging in political life, of deepening, ques-
tioning and innovating our comprehension of the world, of expressing mental states, 
such as beliefs and feelings, or of indirectly educating individuals for tolerant behavior 
in social relations, speech is deemed valuable and worthy of protection just for per-
forming a role by which free speech is cherished. So, the logical implication is this: the 
constitutional safeguard of freedom of speech is neutral as to the content of the spee-
ch, or the content of ideas.
The principle of neutrality means that a message has expressive value whatever 
the topic in question is. Any subject is worthy of being addressed: abortion, reincarna-
tion, sodomy, Marxism, revolution, death penalty, adultery, and witchcraft. There are no 
proper and improper matters. There are no taboos. Also, having expressive value does 
not depend on the viewpoint. Being in favor (pro-choice) or against (pro-life) abortion 
makes no difference. Besides, saying something with expressive value does not depend 
on sounding good to others or being politically correct. It is allowed to spoil modesty, 
to challenge the unquestionable, to confront the dominant ethics. People are not con-
fined only in sympathetic, condescending, virtuous, traditional opinions, nor only do 
have to speak with elegance and softness. Moreover, having expressive value does not 
require speech to be reverent to authorities or allied to government interests.
Constitutional neutrality leaves no room to distinguish between accurate and 
erroneous theories, intelligent and stupid comments, fair and unjust claims. In the eyes 
of third parties, lay people, scholars or authorities, some version of history may seem 
inexact, and the criticism of a literary work may sound unfounded. A religious feeling 
might seem foolish, an appeal for political reform might seem baseless. However, ac-
ceptance and receptivity are not conditions for protecting speech. The quality of what 
somebody says is undoubtedly a relevant predicate in science, philosophy, and religion. 
Constitutional law, however, does not separate in value the clever and the silly thinking. 
Freedom of speech indiscriminately values any speech compatible with the founda-
tions of its protection. Provided that, however fragile, vulgar or unpleasant, speech is 
contained within the limits that allow it to be achieved by the underlying reasons of 
protection, it has expressive value.
If such a simple implication were not so neglected, some state judges in Brazil 
would not have done too much to ban the so-called Marijuana March in 2008. It was no 
more than a demonstration against anti-drug legislation, expected to occur in several 
capitals of the country. The value of the speech had nothing to do with the merit of the 
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ideas. Whether or not the protesters were right or wrong and had or not a good cause 
did not matter at all. The only thing that counted is that they were citizens using their 
freedom to criticize legal canons and ask for new ones.
By the way, there is no difference between protesting against making mariju-
ana use a crime and the law that imposes a tax, or that prohibits the naked in public. 
Somebody could argue that advocating drug release is tantamount to inciting a bre-
ak of the law, and the adoption of criminal conduct. Nevertheless, it is an unfortunate 
mistake to confuse an appeal for changes in the law with a stimulus to break the law. 
Protesting the anti-drug law is not smoking or inciting smoking; it is only expressing 
beliefs and desires in harmony with free speech justifications. So obvious, the Supreme 
Federal Court reversed those injunctions, asserting that “the mere proposal of decrimi-
nalization […] is not to be confused with the act of incitement to commit the crime, or 
with the laudation of the crime, since debating criminal abolition of certain punishable 
conduct can (and should) be carried out rationally, with respect among interlocutors, 
although the idea, for the majority, may be considered strange, extravagant, unaccep-
table or even dangerous”41.
Constitutional neutrality hugely spreads the scope of free speech. Under de-
mocratic perspective, for example, even ideas tending to sound degrading will be 
sheltered. Hypothetically, if before a bill about to pass in parliament supporting same 
sex marriage someone asserts that it is a shame to have the government encouraging 
“unhealthy and indecent unions”, the message would be covered no matter the sexual 
prejudice it holds. Enacting legislation is the most genuine product of political agency. 
In a democracy, if some can argue in favor, others can argue against because all are 
equal in the right to choose a side and to speak about no matter the greater or lesser 
respectability of what they think and say. Since speech does not go beyond opposition 
to a legislative act, it is valuable and irrepressible. 
Similarly, tolerance justification is not only applicable to the good and fair spee-
ch of minorities and dissenters against interests and practices of majorities and con-
servatives, which are considered backward and nefarious. It gives perhaps particular 
value to extremist thinking, one that almost any of us perceive as immoral and racist. 
A man’s comment in an interview that he hates blacks, Muslims and Jews could be the 
case. However, if freedom of speech intends to promote tolerance, the protection of 
extremism best meets such scope because it has higher symbolic significance and pe-
dagogical utility. It is easier to live with the speech of minorities and dissidents when 
the content is politically correct. Nevertheless, the profound meaning of tolerance only 
becomes accessible before the shocking and scandalous thought. To form a tolerant 
41 ADPF 187. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Brasília, 2014. Available at: http://portal.stf.jus.br/processos/down-
loadPeca.asp?id=227098436&ext=.pdf. Access: October 2018. 
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society, which does not yield to the temptations to criminalize ideas under the pretext 
of being false or dangerous, requires pressing the tolerance principle to the extreme as 
a rule and without allowing casuistic manipulations. Moreover, if autonomy is a right, 
no man should be silenced under threat of legal punishment just because what he dis-
likes seems ignoble. 
In the hypotheses described, free speech values undoubtedly apply. In the 
first situation, there is a moral argument against legalizing same sex marriage; in the 
second, there is a confession of aversion feelings toward some groups. Made in the 
assertive mode (not in incitement-to-violence, truly-threatening and fighting-words 
contexts, for instance42), these imaginary (but always possible) statements are both su-
pported, respectively, by the values of democracy and autonomy, and indistinctly by 
the broader rationale of tolerance. 
Examples of detestable ideas are not restricted to the terrain of prejudice. Ima-
gine someone who publicly holds dictatorship as a superior form of political organiza-
tion, terrorism as a legitimate way to fight imperialism, the natural right of man to trade 
in his organs, the sin of protected sex by condoms, woman’s innate right to abort until 
the sixth month, criminal responsibility at ten years of age, the fairness of torturing war 
prisoners during interrogation. Even astounding, these ideas are worthy of protection 
in the light of free speech values.
9. FREE SPEECH AND EQUALITY
The contempt for the principle of neutrality would not only undermine the 
values of democracy, truth, autonomy and tolerance but would hurt a more general 
constitutional precept, according to which people are equal in dignity and, as such, 
must also be equal in respect. Even if free speech was not singular prerogative, the right 
to communicate ideas to others despite their content would work as an autonomous 
consequence of equality. 
All are equal before the law, without distinction of any kind. With this traditional 
formula, many constitutions enunciate the principle of equality. The norm is a complex 
one. Its content is plural. However, there is a predominant meaning. The principle pre-
vents the legislative power from making legal discrimination, that is, conferring some 
rights for some people and not conferring to others, or denying some rights for some 
and not refusing to others. Respecting human dignity is fulfilled, in principle, by the 
attribution of equal privileges and responsibilities to all. 
The principle applies to every domain of human activity, profession, company, 
locomotion, contract, association, leisure, etc. If the statutory law demands higher edu-
cation for a person to become a physician, this requirement should be extended to 
42 See Infra: 10. Speech and Action.
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everyone, except for reasons that may justify different legal treatment (in this case, hard 
to imagine). There is no difference regarding speech. If men are equal in dignity and 
earn the same degree of respect, restricting only some ideas instead of others would 
mean that those who sustain them are less worthy.
Alexander Meiklejohn linked free speech and equality in a sounding equation: 
“No belief or advocacy may be denied freedom if, in the same situation, opposing belie-
fs and advocacies are granted freedom”. Implicitly criticizing the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Schenck, and the persecution of the Communists after the Russian revolution and 
during the cold war, Meiklejohn settled his formula with these remarkable words: “If 
then, in any occasion in the Unites States, it is allowable to say that the Constitution is a 
good document, it is equally allowable, in that situation, to say that the Constitution is a 
bad document. If a public building may be used in which to say, in time of war, that the 
war is justified, then the same building may be used in which to say that it is not justi-
fied. If it be publicly argued that conscription for armed service is moral and necessary, 
it may be likewise publicly argued that it is immoral and unnecessary. If it may be said 
that American political institutions are superior to those of England or Russia or Ger-
many, it may, with equal freedom, be said that those of England or Russia or Germany 
are superior to ours”43.
The principle of equality does not only prohibit the legislative power from 
denying some persons the right to profess specific ideas out of disagreement and 
contrariety while guaranteeing others the right to say the opposite. It binds all public 
powers. For the judiciary, equality takes the form of a duty to invalidate viewpoint dis-
criminations established by statutory law and prevent people from being silenced, im-
prisoned and held accountable. When legislative power yield to inquisitorial pressures 
of majorities or influential organizations, the courts must stop the course of intolerance 
and guarantee the benefits of equality without distinction of ideas. 
  It is true that equality is not totally closed for legal differentiations. Someti-
mes, granting some people the rights denied to others is indispensable to compen-
sate unfortunate situations and to balance opportunities. It might be said that it is the 
case when the law reserves a percentage of vacancies in public service to the disabled. 
Other times, the denial of rights granted to others is permissible based on the logical 
correlation between alegitimate objective and the factor of distinction. It is possibly 
the case when the law sets a minimum age for entry into the armed forces, where re-
tirement takes place early, and youth and excellence of physical condition are require-
ments for doing a good job in the field for the most time possible. 
43 MEIKLEJOHN, Alexander. Testimony Presented Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, United 
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (1955). In: BLASI, Vincent. Ideas of the First Amendment. St. Paul: 
Thomson West (American Casebook Series), 2006, p. 771-772.
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Discriminating speech does not fit into either perspective. To promote equality 
in fact, government does not need to criminalize and suppress the thought it dislikes 
or diverges from. Ensuring that poor or black students have better opportunities in 
life does not depend on outlawing speech, but rather may be attempted through the 
adoption of affirmative programs such as support for the family and pregnant woman 
since prenatal care, breastfeeding control, free enrollment in kindergartens and scho-
ol meals, permanent qualification of elementary education and, perhaps temporarily, 
granting scholarships and setting quotas in universities. It is not indispensable to silen-
ce and punish those who have non-egalitarians views of society.
10. SPEECH AND ACTION
Beyond democracy, truth, tolerance, autonomy and equality, there are at least 
two additional reasons for protecting speech. First, in general, speech contains lower 
degree of danger compared to actions (i.e., non-communicative actions, like driving or 
shooting), at least in the short run. So, there is no need to subject speech to the same 
rigid controls. Speech is the kind of human activity most compatible with full liberty. It 
is not by chance that most civil and criminal offenses concern to actions, not speech, as 
in the cases of physical assault, bank robbery, kidnapping, attempt to commit murder, 
speeding, drunk-driving and so on. 
It is more dangerous firing a weapon toward an adversary than just announcing 
enmity feelings. It is more dangerous to regiment guerrillas and set fire to the govern-
ment headquarters than presenting a lecture on the morality of the Marxism. Therefore, 
violent actions are usually more problematic than speech. Before actions, the time to 
react is slight, the chances of defense are reduced, brutality is often physical, mate-
rial, and evils tend to be intense and, above all, immediate. Police response requires 
promptness and perhaps violence. There is no margin for tolerance. Criminal punish-
ment must be strong enough to be exemplary. Here is a set of effects and demands that 
could hardly apply to something just said or written.
According to Edwin Baker44, the shrill voice breaking a crystal cup is an aberrant 
example, and also something that does not even match with the usual notion of what 
speech means. The sound shattering the glass is, strictly speaking, pure physical force. 
Surely, speech is not always inoffensive. It is an exaggeration to say that “sticks and sto-
nes can break my bones, but names will never hurt me”. However, in most cases, thesis 
a suitable metaphor. 
The lesser capacity to produce immediate and irreversible effects is not a final 
reason for protecting speech. Yet, it helps to justify the difference between actions and 
speech regarding to the respective legal treatment. Actions are significantly repressed 
44 BAKER, Edwin C. Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 55.
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while speech is significantly protected. Once the potential to injure is lower, punitive 
interventions are less needed. Tolerance is possible, and, in principle, bad ideas can be 
counteracted with good ideas. There is time to react through debate and instruction 
without resorting to relentless methods of force.
Using force to counter bad ideas is not just pointless, but also something mis-
placed. Bad actions often violate the rights of others. In a theft, for instance, there is a 
violation of property right; in a homicide, of the right to life; and in default, of the right 
to receive the payment in the due date. Conduct reprehensibility stems precisely from 
damage to the protected legal good. Exceptionally, when the action is committed by 
a person with a mental health condition, is imposed as a means of defense or is asso-
ciated with a fortuitous event, the illicitness disappears because there is no connection 
between a reprehensible conduct and the injurious result. 
Something different happens with speech, especially having in mind the asser-
tive type45, that is, statements of facts and values that the speaker sincerely believes 
to be true or correct and intends to be taken as such by the listeners. Even when the 
content is shocking, asserting something never implies violation of anyone’s right, but 
rather it means the use of one’s own right to assert it. As to other kinds of speech acts, 
such as the directive (orders, requests, advices, etc.) and the commissive (promises, oa-
ths, etc.), the same thing generally occurs, although not always. 
Having a right is to be able to demand something from someone (an object, an 
action, an omission, etc.); having a right violated means that someone didn’t do what 
was demandable. But if John thinks and says, hypothetically, that it is morally justifiable 
to fight the bourgeois society, or if John feels and says he hates Jews for having killed 
Jesus Christ, John won’t be violating anyone’s right simply because no one has the ri-
ght to demand from him to think or to feel otherwise. His opinions and his emotions 
may be bad, but they do not cause an illegal harm to anybody. On the contrary: it is 
John’s own right to express what he believes and feels. If John believes and says that 
only 50,000 Jews died during the holocaust or if John joins a demonstration in favor 
of abortion legalization, again John won’t damage anyone’s right because no one has 
the right to demand from him to believe in another version of history or to embrace 
another political cause. The version can be fragile and ridiculous, and the agenda may 
seem immoral and impious; however, they are not illicit.
Therefore, speech differ from actions because it tends to be less unsafe and not 
to violate rights. It is neither needed nor proper to subject both to the same inflexib-
le canons. There is a fine-tuning between the nature of speech and the possibility of 
freedom. The antidote to evil thinking should not be the speaker’s enforced silence or 
45 On the taxonomy of speech acts, see: SEARLE, John R. Expression and meaning. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, p. 1-29.
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penalty, but the counter-coupling of freedom itself. As Louis Brandeis once wisely said: 
“the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones”46.
It must be said, on the other hand, that speech loses value when it implicates 
deliberate and detrimental consequences to other’s man rights. That’s what happens 
when we are before communications like the false cry of fire in a theater causing panic 
in the crowd, among many others sorts of wrongdoings made with words, such as an 
intentional false report of a crime, agreements to commit a murder, bullying, harass-
ment, slander, threats to get sexual intercourse, encouragement of suicide, etc. Here, as 
earlier noted, there is more action than speech. It’s in fact the case of doIng evil things to 
someone by saying, not of only saying something evil47, and it is expected that protect ed 
rights will be violated, such as the right everyone has of not being falsely reported as a 
criminal or terrified to make unwanted sex.   
In hate speech cases, by the way, it is critical to distinguish. One thing is to state, 
assertively, for instance, that “life was better when blacks and whites were separated”. 
No one has the right to demand a different view, and free speech values apply. But 
there are some quite different scenarios. The first is hateful incitement: when someone 
directly asks the listeners to take illegal, imminent and harmful actions against a person 
or a group based on prejudices of race, religion, origin, gender or sexual orientation. The 
second is hateful threat: when someone threatens to take illegal and harmful actions 
against a person or a group with the intent to cause fear and terror on the same basis. 
The third is hateful insult: when someone, mostly in a face-to-face encounter, utters 
racist epithets against a person with the only purpose of wounding, humiliating or pro-
voking a fight. Again, these are cases of doIng evil thIngs to someone by sayIng(inciting, 
threatening and humiliating or provoking a fight), not of only sayIng somethIng evil. 
Accordingly, rights will be certainly hurt, and free speech values are hardly reachable.
11. CONCLUSION: AN ENLIGHTENING CASE
Considering all things together, the common understanding is that government 
is forbidden to repress speech on a content basis. Content-based limitations are mainly 
those which prohibit and punish speech because of the supposed untruth or wrong-
ness of the message. What generally happens in this case is that the government dis-
believes what the speaker believes, that is, the government does not accept as true the 
proposition that the speaker takes as so. 
46 Whitney v. California. Supreme Court of the Unites States. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
47 The distinction between only saying and doing by saying in the hypotheses we are considering here has 
a clear connection to Austin’s theory of illocutionary acts, especially with the distinction between constative 
and performative categories. According to Austin, the “performative-constative distinction” is “a distinction be-
tween doing and saying”. See: AUSTIN, J.L. How to do things with words. 2. ed. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1975, p. 47. 
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There is an enlightening case. In 1959, the US Supreme Court faced an episo-
de regarding a forbidden film. It was Lady Chatterley’s Lover, a movie adaptation of D. 
H. Lawrence’s novel. The story is about Constance, a young woman whose husband 
Clifford Chatterley becomes paralyzed and sexually incapacitated. Constance lives the 
frustration of a conjugal relationship in which soul and body conflict. Married to an 
impotent aristocrat, she gets involved with an employee and commits adultery. The 
ardent moments of lovers’ intimacy are the plot highlights. 
New York State law conditioned cinematographic exhibits to prior permission of 
its education department. Under the original wording, the law provided that the license 
should not be granted if the movie, in whole or in part, was obscene, indecent, immoral, 
inhuman, sacrilegious or was of such a nature that its display tended to corrupt the 
moral or incite crime. An amendment was later added to clarify what the word immoral 
and the sentence tended to corrupt the moral meant. According to the amendment, a 
movie would be immoral and susceptible to corrupt morality when its dominant pur-
pose or effect was erotic or pornographic; or when exposing acts of sexual immorality, 
perversion or lust, or when expressly or implicitly presenting such actions as desirable, 
acceptable or appropriate standards of behavior. 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover distributor submitted the tape to the responsible divi-
sion. The license was denied. The movie could only be shown if three scenes considered 
immoral were deleted. It did not take care of mere restriction of children and teens ac-
cess. It was a total prohibition even for the adult audience. There was an appeal to ano-
ther administrative instance, but it was unsuccessful. Even worse: the denial was kept 
but on a broader basis. The problem was not the three separate scenes, but the whole 
movie was immoral under the law because presented adultery as desirable, acceptable, 
and appropriate. The case came to courts. The Court of Appeals in the State of New 
York was divided and reformed a lower court decision that favored the distributor and 
backed the administrative refusal of the license. According to the prevailing opinion, 
the prohibition suited the legislation purpose because the movie’s matter was adultery 
presented as right and desirable for certain people under certain circumstances. Thus, 
the litigation reached the Supreme Court. 
The case was decided in favor of the producers thanks to the content-based 
motivations behind the ban. The license was denied on the sole ground of being im-
moral the condescending exposure of an adulterous relationship. The reason was not 
that the movie incited adultery. An argument like this probably would not work in the 
face of the American constitutional legal doctrine at the time. In Whitney v. California, 
the Supreme Court had previously suggested that abstract advocacy of illegal conducts 
does not constitute incitement. Incitement is something like a speech intentionally in-
tended to lead the audience to an unlawful activity that is likely to occur immediately. 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover’s ban was based only on the supposed immorality of the adultery 
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justification. According to authorities, the movie presented adultery as desirable, ac-
ceptable, and appropriate for certain people under certain circumstances, and that was 
immoral. This is a fair illustration of content-based censorship and viewpoint discrimi-
nation. One could believe and speak bad things about adultery, but not good ones.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote the Supreme Court’s opinion. He wrote initially: 
“What New York has done, therefore, is to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture be-
cause that picture advocates an idea – that adultery under certain circumstances may 
be proper behavior.” He further added: “It is contended that the State’s action was jus-
tified because the motion picture attractively portrays a relationship which is contrary 
to the moral standards, the religious precepts, and the legal code of its citizenry.” Then, 
he concluded: “This argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution protects. Its 
guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by 
a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper 
behavior, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax. And in the realm of ideas 
it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing”48.A 
short ruling that corroborates the principle of neutrality: government may not censor 
speech just because its agents do not like or diverge from it, whether they are legisla-
tors, administrators or judges.
Potter Stewart could have argued that Lady Chatterley’s Lover is a fiction work, 
and it does not necessarily contain a value judgment on adultery, that it is just a narra-
tive, a description of some possible human experience. He could have questioned the 
conclusion that the story meant to support lovers’ conduct. However, if Potter Stewart 
moved in that direction, he would not face the critical question under examination, 
whether the government is entitled to forbid an opinion just because it is contrary and 
discordant to the one it prefers, the only one that is deemed compatible with the de-
sirable moral. Potter Stewart examined the case validating the assumption that Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover did indeed contain a supportive message about adultery. Doing so, 
the US Supreme Court protected the opinion despite its content.
Somebody who asserts that adultery is sometimes acceptable holds a point of 
view, a moral opinion on human behavior. He or she states a point that may influence 
marriage legislation. He or she takes a side before a question that does not have a uni-
que, and inescapable answer. He or she speaks his/her mind, maybe opening a contest 
that, locked in the ring of ideas, educates for civilized coexistence. Lady Chatterley’s Lo-
ver’s proscription infringed the right to say no matter what without fearing censorship or 
punishment and contradicted the cardinal values by which free speech is rightly guar-
ded: democracy, truth, autonomy, tolerance, and equality.
48 Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York. Supreme Court 
of the Unites States 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
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